INTRODUCTION
"The law has long recognized that criminal punishment is not appropriate for those who, by reason of insanity, cannot tell right from wrong." 1
In Delling v. Idaho, three Justices, in a rare and intriguing action, joined in dissenting from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a case that would have heard the constitutionality of Idaho's controversial abolishment of the insanity defense. 2 Idaho's current statutory scheme dictates that mental condition is not a defense to any crime. 3 Under this system, criminal defendants are barred from raising an affirmative insanity defense premised on their lack of moral culpability. 4 Instead, any evidence pertaining to mental condition is relevant only in regard to establishing diminished capacity. 5 According to the dissenters, there is a "traditional insanity defense" defined by the defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong. 6 This principle of moral culpability is present in nearly every state's insanity defense, 7 and the Delling dissent indicates that at least three members currently sitting on the Supreme Court would find that a state's failure to recognize a traditional insanity defense violates the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The difference in protection offered by the traditional insanity defense and diminished capacity is profound. 8 Consider the hypothetical case of Roy, a thirty-year-old man who has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. One day Roy is walking down the street when he suffers an unexpected schizophrenic episode. He sees a man approaching him with a gun in his hand.
Roy shouts at the man to "put the gun away," but the man stands his ground. The man begins to raise his weapon towards Roy, and Roy draws his firearm and shoots the man, killing him instantly. It turns out that Roy was under a delusion at the time he shot the man. In reality, the man had nothing in his hand and was simply raising his arms to show Roy he was not a threat.
In a jurisdiction that allows criminal defendants to argue a traditional insanity defense, Roy will be able to demonstrate that as a result of his schizophrenic episode and insane delusion, he felt as if he were acting in self-defense. 9 Had the events been as Roy perceived them, then Roy would have been legally justified in shooting the man raising a gun to him. The jury would receive an instruction regarding the state's formulation of the insanity defense, and Roy will have an opportunity to be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
However, in a diminished capacity jurisdiction that does not permit a traditional insanity defense, Roy will only be allowed to introduce evidence of his mental condition to disprove his requisite intent, also known as mens rea. 10 Roy's schizophrenic delusion will not be an affirmative defense to his actions and would only be considered insofar as it related to his ability to form the intent to shoot the deceased individual. While this evidence might help Roy escape a higher charge, it will not be enough to adjudge him not guilty.
This failure of proof "defense" negatively impacts the mentally ill, for it affords little protection to the criminal defendant who suffers from a serious mental illness. 11 It was Roy's failure to understand that the act was wrong, rather than his failure to understand the act itself, that led him to commit the crime. Thus, the state's rejection of the traditional insanity defense has prevented the defendant from being able to properly defend himself in accordance with the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
At present, five states have eliminated or effectively eliminated the traditional insanity defense, thus preventing a criminal defendant from using his mental condition as an affirmative defense for the crime with which he is charged. 12 Though other states have limited the defense and had such limitations held as constitutionally permissible, none except Idaho, Utah, Montana, Kansas, and Alaska have abolished the insanity defense altogether. 13 While other articles have explored the constitutionality of constrictions on the insanity defense, 14 this Comment is the first to systematically examine the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence from recent cases. The Court's substantive due process analyses in the seminal cases Washington v. Glucksberg 15 and, more recently, Lawrence v. Texas 16 indicate that there is a fundamental, constitutionally guaranteed right to a traditional insanity defense.
Though states have the authority to define and determine their criminal laws as they see fit, they must do so within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 A state that bars a criminal defendant from using the traditional insanity defense has deprived that defendant of a constitutionally guaranteed right. For this reason, the state must be able to demonstrate a compelling state interest for its eliminating the traditional insanity defense and establish that this elimination is necessary to achieve the proffered interest. The actions of Alaska, Idaho, Utah, Montana, and Kansas fail to meet these strict scrutiny requirements.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the inception, evolution, and current status of the traditional insanity defense. Part II outlines the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence and touches on the Supreme Court's recent insanity jurisprudence. Part III defines the traditional insanity defense, arguing that the Supreme Court's substantive due process cases, Glucksberg and Lawrence, indicate that history, tradition, and current awareness make the traditional insanity defense a fundamental right inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. Part IV looks at protections provided in the various traditional and non-traditional insanity test formulations used by the states, arguing that no particular formulation of the defense is required as long as due process is satisfied. Part V addresses the unconstitutionality of diminished capacity as a substitute for a traditional insanity defense. Finally, Part VI addresses some of the ways in which states may narrow their insanity defense consistent with due process.
I. INSANITY DEFENSE OVERVIEW

A. History of the Insanity Defense
The insanity defense has long been a fixture of law. It has roots in ancient Hebrew, Greek, and Roman doctrines. 18 In early English common law, insanity was recognized not as a defense, but rather a "tool for pardon" 19 that was used to protect those who lacked "full reasoning powers and were deprived of moral responsibility." 20 Insanity did not have a formal place in the courtroom until the thirteenth century when it emerged as a mitigating factor in criminal trials. 21 Henry de Bracton, a leading legal scholar and religious figure, is credited with introducing "moral intent" into 18 RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 8 (1984 the law of the courts during this time. 22 By the sixteenth century, tests relying on an ability to distinguish "good and evil" were being used by the English courts. 23 In 1843, the M'Naghten test cemented the importance of moral culpability in criminal law. 24 The modern test for insanity, the M'Naghten test focuses on the defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong. 25
B. The Traditional Insanity Defense
There have been many formulations of the insanity defense since M'Naghten, and three tests for legal insanity are currently in existence in the United States legal system. 26 Each of these tests expressly include, or in practice protect, the right of the defendant to raise an affirmative and complete defense of insanity based on an absence of moral culpability. The heart of the M'Naghten test 29 is the recognition that individuals should not be punished for acts for which they are not morally culpable. 30 M'Naghten provides an affirmative and complete defense to insanity that dictates, [T] o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or The M'Naghten test is extremely flexible in terms of its application and definition. This flexibility is present as a result of the ambiguities in the definitions of "know" 33 and "wrong" 34 in the test's formulation. So long as the principle for moral culpability is combined with an affirmative defense, the protection of M'Naghten is the same, regardless of the precise definition and formulation.
The M'Naghten test was formally articulated in England in 1843, 35 and was adopted throughout the United States shortly thereafter. 36 At present, seventeen states and the federal government use the M'Naghten formulation in its entirety, 37 ten states use its second prong, 38 and three states use M'Naghten coupled with a volitional capacity prong. 39 33 DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 350. Many have noted that the word "know" is defined both narrowly and broadly, and courts' decisions regarding the interpretation of the M'Naghten test have varied in which definition applies. Id. Under the narrow definition, the jury is charged with evaluating the defendant's "formal cognitive knowledge." Id. Using this narrow definition of "know," "[a] person may be found sane if she can describe what she is doing ('I was strangling her') and can acknowledge the forbidden nature of her conduct ('I knew I was doing something wrong')." Id. However, the broad definition of "know" requires only that defendants have "affective knowledge" of their actions. Id. Affective knowledge "is absent unless the actor can evaluate her conduct in terms of its impact on others and appreciate the total setting in which she acts, i.e., can internalize the enormity of the[ir] criminal act and, thus, emotionally appreciate its wrongfulness." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 Id. at 351. Commenters have regularly inquired as to whether the "wrong" in M'Naghten refers to legal wrong or moral wrong. Id. Indeed, Lord Tindal's statement that "the question is whether M'Naghten knew that his act was one which he ought not to do, and if the act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable" supports both interpretations of "wrong." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the United States, jurisdictions using the M'Naghten test regularly deliver the instruction to the jury without defining "wrong," leaving it to the jurors to apply the test as they see fit. See MORRIS, supra note 32, at 13; see also State v. Singleton, 48 A.3d 285, 295 (N.J. 2012) The ALI test recognizes both cognitive and volitional capacity, simultaneously tweaking the language found in M'Naghten to incorporate the idea of substantial rather than complete impairment. 40 Thus, the ALI test broadens the M'Naghten test. 41 The effect has been praised for "permit[ing] a reasonable three-way dialogue between the law-trained judges and lawyers, the medical-trained experts, and the jury." 42 The ALI test dictates that individuals cannot be criminally liable for their actions if they lacked "substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of [their] conduct or to conform [their] conduct to the requirements of law." 43 Some jurisdictions use the language "appreciate the moral wrongfulness" rather than "appreciate the criminality" in describing the individual's conduct. 44 Initially incredibly popular, the ALI test stalled for the very reasons it was originally supported. Following the assassination attempt of Ronald Reagan and subsequent acquittal of John Hinckley, some states began to reconsider their "friendly" insanity M'Naghten's perceived over-reliance on cognitive capacity. See id. Therefore, under the irresistible impulse test, the jury is instructed to consider both the cognitive and volitional capacity of the defendant. Id. The exact definition of the test varies, but in essence, the test provides that defendants are insane if, at the time of the offense, they did not have the power to control their conduct. Id. Dressler cites three different definitions from various jurisdictions:
Generally speaking, a person is insane if, at the time of the offense: (1) she acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse; (2) she lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that [her] free agency was at the time destroyed; or (3) the [defendant's] will . . . has been otherwise than voluntarily so completely destroyed that [her] actions are not subject to it, but are beyond [her] control.
Id. (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
40 DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 354. The ALI test was created in 1962 and became widely used shortly thereafter: "In less than two decades, it was adopted by ten of the eleven federal circuit courts and by a majority of the states." Id. at 347. The product test attempted to modernize the insanity defense by allowing expert testimony to break free of the outdated cognitive or volitional parameters. 47 Under the product test, individuals cannot be liable for their criminal actions if these actions were the product of a mental disease or defect. 48 The defendant is permitted to introduce evidence regarding mental disease or defect, and the court considers this evidence in determining (1) whether the defendant was suffering from the alleged disease or defect at the time of the criminal action and, if so, (2) whether the disease was a but-for cause of the criminal action. 49 The Alaska has adopted what might be called a "half-M'Naghten" standard: A defense of insanity is available if the defendant, because of mental disease or defect was at the time of the act unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the act. Neither inability to appreciate wrongfulness nor to control conduct is part of the Alaska defense. without due process of law." 61 The Supreme Court has interpreted this Due Process Clause as granting citizens with substantive protections from arbitrary government interference over those rights which are "deemed fundamental." 62 The Court has employed multiple methodologies in its determining which rights are considered fundamental.
Washington v. Glucksberg: Careful Descriptions and Historical Focus
The Supreme Court, in 1997, took a narrow view on fundamental rights when a group comprised of both physicians and terminally ill patients challenged the constitutionality of Washington's ban on assisted suicide. 63 The group asserted that there was a fundamental right to dignity in death. 64 The Supreme Court's conservative substantive due process analysis found that no such fundamental right existed and upheld Washington's ban. 65 The Supreme Court in Glucksberg described its substantive due process methodology as a two-part analysis. 66 According to Glucksberg, the Supreme Court requires a "careful description" of the fundamental liberty interest that is "deeply rooted" in the "history and tradition" of the United States. 67 The Glucksberg majority refused to recognize the classification of the fundamental right being asserted by the group challenging Washington's ban on physician-assisted suicide and 61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 62 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). In an often-quoted string of substantive due process tenants, Chief Justice Rehnquist once again reaffirmed that the Court has "regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
replaced it with one it felt was more appropriate. 68 Whereas the challengers to Washington's ban on assisted suicide defined their liberty interest as "the right to choose a humane, dignified death," 69 the majority of the Court redefined it as a "liberty interest . . . by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide." 70 Having carefully described the asserted fundamental right, the Supreme Court underwent an exhaustive history-focused investigation into the existence of a tradition regarding assisted suicide. 71 The Court referenced Anglo-American common-law tradition, 72 thirteenth-century legal scholars, 73 the legal practices of the colonies, 74 and early American statutes, 75 finding that there was no longstanding tradition recognizing assisted suicide. 76 Thus, the Court dictated that there was not a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide. 77 Once the Court refused to recognize a fundamental right to assisted suicide, Washington's statutory ban only needed to pass a rational basis review test in order to be upheld. 78 [t]he history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide . . . has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the . . . "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest . . . .
Id. at 728.
78 Id. at 728 ("The Constitution also requires . . . that Washington's assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests. This requirement is unquestionably met here.") (citation omitted).
79 Id.
Lawrence v. Texas: Broad Statements and Emerging Awareness
The Supreme Court completely changed direction in its substantive due process methodology just six years after issuing its opinion in Glucksberg when it handed down Lawrence v. Texas. 80 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to an anti-sodomy statute for the second time in less than twenty years and overturned its previous decision, Bowers v. Hardwick. 81 The Lawrence Court recognized that there was a fundamental right to private intimate sexual conduct between consenting adults that was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 82 Whereas the substantive due process analysis in Glucksberg had focused on carefully defining asserted fundamental rights, the analysis in Lawrence was characterized by its emphasis on defining fundamental rights based upon "broad statements." 83 In Bowers, the Supreme Court defined the fundamental right being asserted in a manner akin to what would later be done in Glucksberg, carefully defining the right as one to engage in homosexual sodomy. 84 However, using its new, broader characterization, the Lawrence Court found that there was a fundamental right for individuals to engage in private intimate sexual conduct. 85 The Lawrence Court also shied away from its extreme emphasis on history and longstanding traditions that was present in Glucksberg, placing added importance on more recent trends 735 (2006) . Seventeen-year-old Eric Michael Clark shot and killed a police officer and was charged with first-degree murder "for intentionally or knowingly killing a law enforcement officer in the line of duty." Id. at 743. Clark was subsequently "found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state hospital for treatment" for two years. Id. Following a determination of competency, Clark waived his right to a jury trial. Id. At trial, Clark did not at any point deny that he shot and killed the police officer, "but relied on his undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident in denying that he had the specific intent to shoot a law enforcement officer or knowledge that he was doing so, as required by the statute." Id. The judge issued a verdict of first-degree murder. Arizona confines the admissibility of evidence relating to criminal defendants' mental state to the issue of proving insanity. 93 Thus, testimony regarding a defendant's mental state is not admissible for the purpose of negating the specific intent of the charged offense. 94 Clark challenged Arizona's formulation for two reasons. First, Clark argued that the state's refusal to recognize a "side-byside M'Naghten test" denied him due process. 95 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding Arizona's formulation of the insanity defense to be constitutionally permissible. 96 The majority went out of its way to state that although it had "never [before] held that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense," it similarly had not "held that the Constitution does not so require." 97 The majority felt that this case did "not call upon [them] to decide the matter" 98 because there was no shortchanging of a constitutional minimum in Arizona's abbreviated M'Naghten. 99 The Court's leaving open the question of whether or not the insanity defense is constitutionally required is quite telling. It stands to reason that if the majority felt that there was not a right to an insanity defense, it would have dictated as much. Perhaps the Court's finding that no constitutional minimum had been "shortchanged" indicates that the Court believed a constitutional minimum does exist. Indeed, the Court's recognition of an insanity 99 Id. at 753 ("Nor does Arizona's abbreviation of the M'Naghten statement raise a proper claim that some constitutional minimum has been shortchanged."). It is undisputed that Clark was able to introduce all of the evidence relating to his mental capacity, both cognitive and moral, in order to prove insanity, and according to the Court, "the cognitively incapacitated are a subset of the morally incapacitated within the meaning of the standard M'Naghten rule." Id. at 754-56. defense premised solely in terms of moral culpability lends credence to the presumption that it meets the level of a constitutional minimum, or is, itself, the minimum. 100 Regardless of the inferences that may be drawn from Clark, one thing is certain: the Court recognized that the right may exist.
Delling v. Idaho: A Cautioning Dissent
Presumably there are three current Justices who would find there is a fundamental right to a traditional insanity defense premised on the defendant's ability to tell right from wrong. [s]ince evidence going to both cognitive and moral capacity was admissible under Arizona law, the Court held that the statute did not contravene the Due Process Clause. Although the decision is not dispositive of the issue, it is a significant indicator that the legal capacity for general criminal responsibility, or blameworthiness is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 202 (1977) wrong, Idaho allows for the introduction of evidence relating to diminished capacity. 107 The dissenters were understandably upset with the Court's decision to deny certiorari in a case such as this, for a select few states were abandoning centuries-old legal practice. While states have great latitude in crafting definitions of criminal actions and punishments, 108 Idaho is one of the few states that have abandoned the principle of moral culpability. 109 The dissenters recognized that Idaho's abolition was indeed "significant" 110 in its refusal to embrace this principle. In its concluding remarks, the dissent indicated that Idaho's elimination of the traditional insanity defense may have run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 111 Based on their dissent, it is safe to presume that the three Justices would have deemed the traditional insanity defense to be a fundamental right worthy of protection from state interference.
III. THE TRADITIONAL INSANITY DEFENSE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
A. Traditional Insanity Defense Defined
A traditional insanity defense is an affirmative and complete defense that gives a criminal defendant the opportunity to argue that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time he committed the charged offense. [T] he difference between the traditional insanity defense and Idaho's standard is that the latter permits the conviction of an individual who knew what he was doing, but had no capacity to understand that it was wrong." Id.
111 Id. at 506 ("I would grant the petition for certiorari to consider whether Idaho's modification of the insanity defense is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.").
112 See id. at 505; Nusbaum, supra note 14, at 1517-18 (discussing the typical view of the insanity defense as an affirmative defense used by the defendant to "exculpate despite the state's ability to prove all elements of the offense charged"); see also Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 80 (Nev. 2001) (stating that "'the essence of the defense . . . has been that a defendant must have the mental capacity to know the nature of his act and culpability, found in nearly every state's insanity defense, 113 has been legally recognized for over one hundred seventy years. 114
B. Substantive Due Process Analysis
The Court will undertake an exhaustive substantive due process analysis should it hear a challenge to a state's statutory abolition of the insanity defense. The analysis will be guided by the approaches dictated in either Glucksberg or Lawrence, or perhaps even an amalgamation of the two. Regardless of the methodology employed, the outcome will remain the same. The Court would necessarily find a fundamental right to a traditional insanity defense exists.
Glucksberg Analysis
The Court in Glucksberg articulated a substantive due process analysis for determining what rights were fundamental and thus deserving of special protection from government interference. 115 The two-part analysis required a "'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest" 116 that was "deeply rooted in th [e] S. 702 (1997) . The Court acknowledges that this is a "restrained methodology" that is used to "rein in the subjective elements . . . by establishing a threshold requirement-that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right-before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action," thus avoiding "the need for complex balancing of competing interests in every case." Id. at 721-22.
116 Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court used a myriad of selected phrases to convey its notion of fundamentality: "[T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Id. at 720-21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
118 Id. at 721 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ).
a. "Careful Description" of the Fundamental Right Being Asserted: The Right to Affirmative Defense Demonstrating an Inability to Distinguish Right from Wrong
A criminal defendant who challenges a state's statutory abolition of the insanity defense asserts a fundamental right to a traditional insanity defense as defined in Part III.A. 119 The defendant seeks the right to raise the affirmative and complete defense of insanity to demonstrate his inability to tell right from wrong at the time of the charged offense. 120 The Court requires a "careful description," in part, to "rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in dueprocess judicial review." 121 In Glucksberg, the Court refused to recognize the respondent's asserted fundamental right and instead redefined it in accordance with its "careful description" method. 122 Whereas the petitioners in Glucksberg asserted a fundamental right to "choose how to die" 123 and "control . . . one's final days," 124 the Court defined the right being asserted as the right "to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so." 125 Though the Court redefined the fundamental right asserted by the respondents in Glucksberg, it would be unlikely to do so in the case of a criminal defendant asserting a fundamental right to a traditional insanity defense.
Unlike the respondents in Glucksberg, who used abstract notions in defining the asserted fundamental right, challengers to 119 See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 68 (Nev. 2001) (striking down Nevada's statutory scheme, which abolished the traditional insanity defense). In Finger, a criminal defendant challenged Nevada's abolition of the insanity defense, in part, alleging that "the ability of an accused to pursue a defense of legal insanity is a fundamental right under the due process clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions." Id. at 70; see also Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 581-82 (Miss. 1931 state laws abolishing the insanity defense have already carefully described the fundamental right being denied in concrete terms. 126 Thus, future potential challengers can assert a tangible fundamental right to a traditional insanity defense premised on moral culpability without having to worry about judicial redefinition of the asserted liberty interest.
b. "Deeply Rooted" Fundamental Right
The right of a criminal defendant to raise a traditional insanity defense, defined by his ability to demonstrate an absence of moral culpability, 127 is deeply rooted in "our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." 128 Indeed, the traditional insanity defense has long been recognized both in the practices of other civilized nations in the distant past 129 and in the current United States legal system. 130 The concept of moral culpability is found in "the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea: an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty." 131 This concept is incorporated in the traditional insanity defense and has been a fixture in the law since as early as 1100 A.D. Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 80 (Nev. 2001 ) (stating that "'recognition of insanity as a defense is a core principle that has been recognized for centuries by every civilized system of law in one form or another.'" (quoting State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 372 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, J., dissenting))). The court in Finger also recognized that the "essence of the defense . . . has been that a defendant must have the mental capacity to know the nature of his act and that it was wrong." Id. (quoting Herrera, 895 P.2d at 372 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). With this lengthy history, it stands to reason that the traditional insanity defense is deeply rooted. The historical foothold of the asserted fundamental right in Glucksberg stands as an inverse to the fundamental right asserted by potential challengers to the statutory abolition of the traditional insanity defense. Whereas the respondents in Glucksberg asserted a right to something that had not been recognized in "our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices," 137 the challengers to the abolition of the traditional insanity defense have a very strong case regarding the defense's deep roots. The Court noted in Glucksberg that a lengthy practice by "'common consent . . . will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.'" 138 This necessarily implies that the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights which have been historically recognized by the states.
Though the substantive due process analysis in Glucksberg focused primarily on historical practice, the Court briefly mentioned the status of the asserted fundamental right among the states. 139 According to the Court, "[t]hough deeply rooted, the States' assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed." 140 To this point, states similarly reexamined their insanity defense practices following the acquittal of Hinckley. 141 Out of this reexamination, the recognition of a traditional insanity defense remained intact in all but five states. 142 These five states are clearly breaking from both historical and modern practice.
Lawrence Analysis a. "Broad Statement" of the Fundamental Right Being Asserted: Meaningful Opportunity to Have Mental Illness Relate to Culpability
The "broad statement" of the fundamental right asserted by those challenging the abolition of the traditional insanity defense can be defined as the right to a meaningful opportunity to have mental illness relate to culpability. The absence of the traditional insanity defense denies a criminal defendant an opportunity to demonstrate a lack of moral culpability despite the state's proving every element of crime. 143 In the eyes of the Lawrence Court, the careful description requirement of asserted fundamental rights can lead to a "failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake." 144 Presumably, those who do not recognize a fundamental right to refute moral culpability would be more sympathetic to an asserted fundamental right based on presenting a complete defense.
b. "Emerging Awareness" of the Fundamental Right
The Lawrence Court shied away from the extreme emphasis on historical practice and traditions that was present in Glucksberg. 145 The Court changed course, proclaiming that "laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance." 146 If this is true, then it follows that the traditional insanity defense has a strong case for categorization as a fundamental right.
There has been, and continues to be, a widespread recognition of the traditional insanity defense. At present, all but five states have in place a traditional insanity defense or an equally protective alternative. 571-72 (noting that "[t] hese references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection"). The Court further dictated that "history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry." Id. (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147 See supra note 28.
is alive and well, and the scholarly commentary regarding abolition of the traditional insanity defense is overwhelmingly negative. 148 Widespread recognition of the traditional insanity defense continues to thrive not only throughout the majority of the states, but also throughout the rest of the world. 149 The Lawrence Court spoke to the importance of world-wide recognition when it discussed the "values we share with a wider civilization." 150 Indeed, the traditional insanity defense currently practiced throughout the world continues to be a method for detracting from criminal liability. 151 (2006) . Canada recognizes the traditional insanity defense, providing that individuals are not "criminally responsible" if they are "incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of an act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong." Id. at 15. Brazil also recognizes a traditional insanity defense based on the M'Naghten test. Id. at 56. France's insanity defense is, in essence, a combination of the product and M'Naghten tests with the irresistible impulse attachment, stating that individuals are not criminally liable if they were "suffering from a psychic or neuropsychic disorder which destroyed [their] S. 113, 155 (1973) .
C. Application of Strict Scrutiny
be narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose. 153 While states certainly have a compelling interest in protecting their citizens from dangerous individuals, statutory abolition of the traditional insanity defense is not necessary to further this interest, thus it fails the narrow tailoring requirement, and denies citizens due process.
IV. NO PARTICULAR FORMULATION OF THE TRADITIONAL INSANITY DEFENSE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED SO LONG AS IT MEETS THE CONSTITUTIONAL MINIMUM
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause ensures every criminal defendant an affirmative and complete defense of insanity premised on the defendant's inability to distinguish right from wrong. This is the constitutional minimum that must be provided to every criminal defendant. How states elect to craft this defense is within their discretion. 154 There are many formulations and variations of the traditional insanity defense that offer sufficient protection to criminal defendants and are within the scope of the fundamental right. Returning to the various insanity tests detailed in Part I.B., it is evident that each meet the requisite level of protection to satisfy due process.
A. M'Naghten and Traditional Variations Satisfy Due Process
The M'Naghten Test
As an affirmative and complete defense that defines insanity in terms of a defendant's capacity to distinguish right from wrong, the M'Naghten test 155 satisfies due process. Despite being the most restrictive of the traditional insanity defenses, 156 the M'Naghten test meets the constitutionally required minimum level of protection. The most restrictive variation of M'Naghten defines wrong according to legality rather than morality. 157 Due process is satisfied even under this definition. 158 Except in extreme and rare circumstances, moral wrong and legal wrong will be "coextensive." 159 States that use the broad variation, recognizing wrong to encompass moral wrong, define moral wrong "from a societal" rather than "personal[] standard." 160 That is, they require that the defendant was incapable of determining whether or not his actions were contrary to "accepted objective societal notions of morality." 161 This definition certainly satisfies due process, for the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate a lack of moral culpability.
The American Law Institute's (ALI) Model Penal Code Test
The ALI test, built on much of what M'Naghten had articulated, replaces M'Naghten's "knowing" requirement with "appreciating." 162 Furthermore, the ALI test requires only "substantial" incapacity rather than complete incapacity as is understood in other traditional insanity defenses. 163 As a version of the insanity defense that is broader than the M'Naghten test, the ALI definition of insanity satisfies due process.
B. Equally Protective Alternative that Satisfies Due Process: The Durham Product Test
The product test is ostensibly the broadest insanity defense available to criminal defendants. 164 An affirmative defense, the product test dictates that criminal defendants are not liable for actions if the actions are the result of mental disease or defect, provided that their defect is the but-for cause of the action. 165 For this reason, the product test satisfies due process.
V. DIMINISHED CAPACITY IS NOT AN EQUALLY PROTECTIVE ALTERNATIVE AND DOES NOT SATISFY DUE PROCESS
As shown in Part IV, states may implement a variety of insanity defense formulations that meet the level of protection found in the traditional insanity defense, but diminished capacity is not a constitutionally permissive alternative.
A. Diminished Capacity Is Not a True Defense
Unlike the traditional insanity defense, the doctrine of diminished capacity is not an affirmative defense. Rather than be labeled as a defense, diminished capacity should be called what it truly is: "merely a rule of evidence." 166 The diminished capacity rule of evidence fails to provide an avenue for acquittal that isn't housed in the definition of the charged crime. 167 The State's willingness to accept evidence on an element of a crime, rather than excluding such evidence, is not a substitute for an actual affirmative defense.
Diminished capacity restricts the defendant's introduction of evidence relating to mental illness or defect. 168 Defendants are only able to introduce this evidence for the purpose of negating the specific intent of the charged crime. 169 The diminished capacity doctrine, concerned only with specific criminal intent, thus breaks from the traditional insanity defense's recognition of moral culpability.
As a failure of proof "defense," diminished capacity fails to protect mentally ill criminal defendants. Diminished capacity does not account for the mentally ill criminal defendant who knowingly commits a crime while failing to understand that the act was In an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the United States, Roy would have the opportunity to demonstrate that as a result of his schizophrenic episode and insane delusion, he felt as if he were acting in selfdefense. The jury would receive an instruction regarding the state's formulation of the insanity defense, and should the jury believe Roy acted justifiably given his delusion, he would be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
However, in a diminished capacity jurisdiction that does not permit a traditional insanity defense, Roy would only be allowed to introduce evidence of his mental condition to disprove his requisite intent. Roy's schizophrenic delusion would not be an affirmative defense to his actions and would only be considered insofar as it related to his ability to form the intent to shoot the deceased individual. While this evidence might help Roy escape a higher charge, it would not be enough to adjudge him not guilty.
It cannot be said that this man was morally culpable for killing another under these circumstances, for in his schizophrenic state he was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. To prevent him from presenting a defense based on his moral culpability would go against the principles of punishment and the longstanding tradition of considering the moral culpability of to these individuals, providing defendants this lower burden of proof allows the state to narrow the insanity defense consistent with due process. 175 This argument is flawed in that it fails to recognize the constitutional minimum that exists.
The same scholars opine that because the Supreme Court in Clark found that no particular insanity test was fundamental, states may abolish the defense and craft whatever criminal laws they see fit. 176 While it may be true that no particular formulation is constitutionally required, there is a substantive level of protection that must be met.
This level of protection is defined by an affirmative and complete defense premised on right and wrong. The insanity formulation, in whatever form that satisfies due process, must be delivered to the jury. A more favorable burden without the substantive protection fails to adequately protect criminal defendants.
VI. NARROWING THE INSANITY DEFENSE CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS
There are ways in which states may narrow their insanity defense that are consistent with due process. These various measures do not result in a "shortchang[ing]" 177 of a fundamental right. Moreover, these measures achieve the compelling interests cited by states which have abolished the traditional insanity defense and are narrowly tailored. 178 over a M'Naghten Approach, 84 MISS. L.J. 215, 238-39 (2014) (dictating that under the diminished capacity doctrine "a defendant only needs to raise a reasonable doubt").
175 Id. at 230 (claiming that "no one formulation of the insanity defense is deeply rooted enough in history and tradition to raise it to the level of a fundamental right"); see also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 (2006) (stating that with its "varied background, it is clear that no particular formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice").
177 Clark, 548 U.S. at 753. 178 Presumably, the most compelling state interest would be protection of citizenry from dangerous individuals. Interestingly, there has for some time been a misconception that criminal defendants abuse the insanity defense in order to escape serving jail time and are sometimes successful in doing so. See DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 360 ("Abolitionists assert that the insanity defense results in abuse of the criminal justice system. They claim that the defense is frequently asserted and too often successful. Implicit in this argument is that insanity claims, including successful of proof on establishing insanity consistent with due process. 183 In Leland v. Oregon, the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon statute that required criminal defendants to establish insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 184 States truly concerned with an abuse of the insanity plea could do the same. 185 By raising the burden of proof on criminal defendants seeking to plead insanity, the states could very effectively discourage false pleas, and only the most meritorious insanity pleas would be litigated. This measure is consistent with due process and does not deny any individual a fundamental right to a traditional insanity defense.
CONCLUSION
A fundamental right to a traditional insanity defense exists premised on the defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong. This affirmative and complete defense embraces the principle of moral culpability that is well established in criminal justice systems around the world.
Examining this issue through the lens of the narrow Glucksberg approach to fundamental rights, it is evident that the traditional insanity defense is deeply rooted in this nation's history and traditions. Taking the broader Lawrence approach to fundamental rights, there is still an overwhelming recognition of the traditional insanity defense in the last fifty years. This past and present embracing of the traditional insanity defense bolsters its argument for its being placed among those rights deemed to be fundamental.
The actions of the five states that have abandoned their traditional insanity defenses is constitutionally suspect and for good reason. These states are breaking away from what has been the general practice for over 200 years while simultaneously 183 See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 798-99 (1952) . 184 Id. 185 Interestingly, Leland failed to address just how far states could go in raising the burden of proof on criminal defendants for various charges. While it is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that there is room for debate concerning the extent to which states can narrow the insanity defense consistent with due process by raising the burden of proof on the defendant. Id. abandoning a practice still recognized and respected by an overwhelming majority of the states.
Numerous insanity models provide the base level of protection found in the traditional insanity defense; however, the diminished capacity doctrine is not one of them. The states that have substituted the diminished capacity failure of proof "defense" for their traditional insanity models have failed to recognize that such an act results in a shortchanging of a constitutional minimum. Diminished capacity does not give the defendant an affirmative and complete defense to the crime with which he is charged, and it fails to adequately protect mentally ill criminal defendants. Furthermore, diminished capacity does not give the defendant a meaningful opportunity to relate mental illness to moral culpability because it prevents the defendant from arguing that he was unable to tell right from wrong at the time he committed the charged crime.
There are a number of ways in which states may narrow their insanity models that are consistent with due process. First, states may opt to embrace more restrictive definitions in the existing traditional insanity defense models. Second, states may raise the burden of proving insanity. These acts succeed in achieving the interests of the states seeking to prevent any potential abuses of the legal system. More importantly, though, is the fact that these measures do not deny criminal defendants the substantive level of protection that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
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